Recent approaches to human concept learning have successfully combined the power of symbolic, infinitely productive, rule systems and statistical learning. The aim of most of these studies is to reveal the underlying language structuring these representations and providing a general substrate for thought. Here, we ask about the plasticity of symbolic descriptive languages. We perform two concept learning experiments, that consistently demonstrate that humans can change very rapidly the repertoire of symbols they use to identify concepts, by compiling expressions which are frequently used into new symbols of the language. The pattern of concept learning times is accurately described by a Bayesian agent that rationally updates the probability of compiling a new expression according to how useful it has been to compress concepts so far. By portraying the Language of Thought as a flexible system of rules, we also highlight the intrinsic difficulties to pin it down empirically.
Introduction
How can children acquire a vast universe of concepts with seemingly very little exposure? One possible solution to this conundurm, known as the Plato Problem [1, 2] , builds on the human capacity to describe concepts -and more generally of all elements language; 2) find the shortest compatible program for some concepts in that language;
3) compare the length of these programs with the subjective difficulty of the concepts; and finally 4) repeat this process for various languages within a universe of possible candidates and choose the one that gives the best match. As mentioned before, the length of the program depends on the primitives of the language in which this program is written, so different languages make different predictions.
A natural question is whether the primitives of a LoT are universal -both across different individuals and also throughout development-or if instead the semantic repertoire of a language is dynamic and shaped by experience. This posits an important challenge when trying to pin down a LoT in a certain domain: if the LoT is shaped by experience, then it should vary according to the sequence of concepts to which each participant was exposed to.
In this work, we show that the subjective difficulty of sequential Boolean concepts is inconsistent with a universal, static LoT. We examine the hypothesis that humans have the ability to recombine propositions of a LoT, becoming a new primitive of the language. In other words, that learning leads to a process of compiling routines into functions within the LoT. In the example of the Logo language one can imagine that if productions which draw squares are very frequent, it would be efficient to devote a new symbol to this production. The new symbol 'square' is a hierarchical 'second order' construction of the 'first order' primitives of the language. It has a cost (of increasing the lexicon of the language) but in the new language, drawing a square can be instantiated with a very short program (namely, 'square') and hence uses less memory. This does not entail an advantage for a universal Turing Machine, but for human computation, which is bounded by severe memory limitations, compiling symbols may be a fundamental process of learning.
This idea -which in pure theoretical terms lies at the essence of Solomonoff induction [22] -, has been exploited in most traditional cognitive architectures [23, 24, 25, 26] , where useful programs are stored in memory as modules for later use. It was also present in the first conceptions of a LoT [4] , where it is stated that even if a low-level, 3 internal language would in principle suffice to express any thought [27] , computational constraints make it such that compressing frequently used concepts using a higher level language allows us to reach a higher level of abstraction by freeing memory and processing power, thus making more complex thoughts thinkable [28] . Recently, powerful models of concept learning have shown that very complex representations can be learned from only a few positive examples via probabilistic program induction [29, 30, 31, 32] , where programs previously learned are stochastically stored in memory to be used in new programs, according to their probability of being useful. It was also the main drive in the recent resurgence of neural networks, where concepts of increasing complexity are hierarchically compiled in deeper layers, biasing the network towards learning a final conceptual layer that is a combination of simpler layers [33] .
Here, we build on this idea and perform two logical concept learning experiments to show that humans can change very rapidly -in the course of an experiment-the repertoire of symbols they use to identify concepts. Each of these experiments explores a different domain of logic, but both share the same strategy of splitting participants in two groups, in such a way that each group is presented with different sequence of concepts. One of the two groups is presented with concepts that are succinctly described if a certain target logical operator T is used, which we presume does not form part of the natural repertoire of LoT in this specific domain. However, these concepts can also be described with a sensibly lengthy combination of primitives excluding T .
We show how the exposure to this set of concepts 'compile' the target operator in a way that, after exposure, subjective complexity is described by an extended language in which T has been incorporated to the set of primitives. Furthermore, we show that the relative subjective difficulty of concepts throughout the task is consistent with that of a Bayesian agent that rationally updates the probability of compiling T according to how useful it has been to compress concepts so far. 
Methods
In this paper, we study four-variable Boolean concepts. Here, a concept is defined as a subset of the 16 possible items that can be created by combining all states of this four variables, and we say that a logical formula or statement is compatible with a given concept if the statement holds true only for the items in the subset. For example, the formula x 3 , is not compatible with the concept shown in Fig. 1 (i. e. the subset of objects that have the first and the second lights on), but the formula x 1 ∧ x 2 is. A formula is a syntactic object, and its semantics is a concept. Hence any given concept is compatible with infinitely many formulas. For example, the concept from Fig. 1 is compatible with the formula x 1 ∧ x 2 , the formula x 1 ∧ x 2 ∧ x 2 , and so on.
To test how human subjective difficulty of concepts depends on the sequence of concepts previously learned, we designed two experiments. In the first experiment, we ask whether experience can make more frequent the use of the 'exclusive or' (xor, notated ⊕), a symbol which is very rarely used in spontaneous human reasoning [11] .
In the second experiment we ask whether humans can learn a useful operator of temporal logic, whose expressive power (in the general setting) is beyond that of propositional Boolean logic. 
Experiment 1
In the first experiment 22 participants between 21 and 32 years old were divided randomly into a control group and a target group. The two groups were presented with different sequences of six concepts. For each concept, there was a learning phase, a testing phase and a feedback phase (see Fig. 2 ). The average time spent in each concept was 121±25 s.e.m. seconds, and the average duration of the task was 19±3
s.e.m. minutes.
Testing phase
Which of these are blickets?
shu✏ing shu✏ing These are your mistakes.
Try again.
Feedback phase Learning phase
These are blickets The three phases in learning each concept. During the learning phase, 'blickets' (i.e. items belonging to the current concept) were highlighted with bold border among the 16 objects in the screen. Then, in the testing phase, the position of items was randomized in the screen (shuffling) and subjects were asked to mark the blickets. In the feedback face, participants' mistakes were indicated with red crosses. Participants iterated between the testing and feedback phases until the classification of all blickets are correct. Participants in the first experiment experienced a sequence of six concepts in this manner.
During the learning phase, all 16 items were presented in the screen (in random order), and items belonging to the concept were identified with bold boundaries (see Fig. 2 ). Participants were told that only the items with bold boundaries were 'blickets' (or 'tufas', etc.: we used different words for each concept in the sequence), and asked them to try to identify what a blicket was. During the testing phase, the 16 items were shuffled in the screen, and participants were asked to click on items that were blickets. If they made mistakes after submitting their answer, they were directed to the feedback phase, in which items that were incorrectly classified were indicated with a red cross. After having studied the feedback, participants were redirected to the testing screen, where items were reshuffled. When every item was correctly classified, 6 participants were asked to give a verbal description of the concept and then continued on to the following concept after a resting period. They had up to 5 chances to learn each concept correctly, otherwise they were directed to the following concept. We characterize the subjective difficulty of each concept as the time the participant spent in learning, testing and feedback phases for that concept (excluding the time spent in the verbal description), and normalized it by dividing it over the total time spent in all concepts, to account for individual differences in learning speed.
Both groups (target and control), were exposed to 6 concepts. The second, third and fourth concepts were different between both groups (i.e. training concepts), and the last two concepts were the same for both groups (i.e. test concepts). The first concept was the trivial concept x i for both groups, which was aimed to get participants started in the task.
As mentioned in the introduction, the minimum description length (MDL) of a concept formalizes its degree of simplicity, and depends on a) the language that we use to describe such concept, and b) the notion of 'size' for terms in such language.
In our case, the language is given in the form of a context-free grammar with rules to construct logical formulas, and the size is fixed as the number of logical operators and atoms occurring in the formula -an atom is either a propositional variable or a negation thereof. The MDL of a concept C is defined as the size of the shortest formula compatible with C. For example, the MDL of the concept in Fig. 1 in the language of propositional logic is equal to 3, which is the amount of variables and operators in the minimal formula
We consider grammars Bool and Xor (see Fig. 3 ), each grammar completely defines a language. The Bool grammar has rules for conjunction (notated ∧), disjunction (notated ∨), and (possibly negated) propositional symbols x 1 , x 2 , x 3 and x 4 . The Xor grammar has an additional rule for the exclusive disjunction (notated ⊕).
For example, the concept C ="either light x 1 is on, or light x 2 is on, but not both" can be described as x 1 ⊕ x 2 in the language given by Xor. In fact, one can check that this is the shortest formula compatible with C, and so the MDL of C with respect to
Xor is as Bool plus rule
Temp is as Bool plus rules start, bool and atom. These CFGs are used to produce logical statements. For example, the formula ((
is produced in the Bool CFG as shown in the syntactical tree (d).
Xor is 3. If we change the language to Bool, we can no longer describe C as
because ⊕ is not available in Bool. However, in the language given by Bool, this concept is described by the minimal formula (x 1 ∧ ¬x 2 ) ∨ (x 2 ∧ ¬x 1 ), of size 7. One can show that in fact there is no shorter formula in Bool describing C, and so the MDL of C with respect to Bool is 7.
As shown in Table 1 , we presented the target group with training concepts which were easy to describe using ⊕, but quite complex if other logical operators were use instead. More technically, concepts for which the MDL relative to Xor are much shorter than the MDL relative to Bool.
Participants in the control group, on the other hand, experienced a sequence of concepts that could be easily described using the language given by Bool. After these training concepts, both groups were presented with the same pair of test concepts: one which could be already succinctly described in Xor, and one for which there the MDL did not depend on the underlaying grammar Xor or Bool. We compared learning times between the two groups for these last two concepts.
As shown in Table 1 , training concepts for the target (xor) group were:
x i ⊕x j ⊕x k , and x k ⊕x l . Training concepts for the control group were: x i , x i ∨x j , x i ∧x j , and x k ∨ x l (we use the indexes i, j, k, l instead of numbers because variables were randomized for each subject). After these four concepts, both groups were presented with the same test concepts:
Choosing which concepts to show to the target group in order for them to 'learn' the xor operator is a critical component of our analysis and experimental design. Crucially, the learner must have an option between two alternatives that describe the concept:
one that is succinct but uses the xor operator, or necessarily a much longer one in the absence of xor. In other words, these concepts must be compatible with short logical formulas if and only if these are generated by the Xor language. To ensure that this was the case, we listed, for each concept, all formulas produced by the Bool and Xor grammars up to length 19. Afterwards, we looked for each training concept in the target group the shorter compatible logical formula from the Bool grammar Target Group (xor)
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Bool Table 1 : Sequence of concepts from Experiment 1. Set of concepts presented to both groups in the first experiment.
MDL is measured as the number of operators and variables (excluding the not operator) of the minimal formula with respect to the specified CFG (the abbreviation 'wrt' stands for 'with respect to'). Variables were randomized in each experiment:
, that is, for any of the four colors.
and compared it with the shorter compatible formula from the Xor grammar. For all training concepts of the xor group, the shortest compatible formula without the xor operator is much longer than the shortest compatible formula with the xor operator. This is shown in Table 1 .
Experiment 2
In the second experiment 17 participants between 23 and 29 years old learned a sequence of 5 concepts. The average duration of the task was 18±4 s.e.m. minutes.
We told them that a certain fruit was able to grow only in certain types of fourday sequences (called 'week' from now on), and were then requested to identify these sequences in the same way as in the first experiment, going through the learning phase, testing phase and feedback phase (see Fig. 2 ). This is, instead of objects containing colors as in Experiment 1, each of the 16 objects contained a four-day weather forecast, such that the 16 objects were each possible sequence of rainy or sunny days, and each of the four variables x 1 , x 2 , x 3 and x 4 denote, rain at Mon, Tue, Wed, and Thu, respectively (see Fig. 4 ).
For this specific set of concepts, the language of description is temporal logic, which
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Bool Test F(r ∧ F¬r) 5 11 is able to predicate about future events using a very simple syntax. Unlike in propositional logic, in temporal logic we can succinctly express concepts involving temporal patterns. For example, using a very short statement (namely, F(r ∧ F¬r), see below),
we can say that a four-day object is a blicket only if in this object there is a rainy day followed by a sunny day. To formulate this apparently simple statement in propositional logic, the minimal formula is (
, which is much more complex than the statement thought as a temporal pattern.
Formally, in temporal logic formulas are evaluated at a certain day of the week. Following the same strategy as in Experiment 1, here we also consider two grammars (see Fig. 3 ): Bool and Temp. The semantics for Bool are just as the one for experiment 1 -only the context was changed: on/off color lights before, are rainy/sunny days now.
The Temp grammar have additional rules for the temporal part of the logic: rules for F, G and the (possibly negated) r, whose the semantics are as explained above.
Notice that although the semantics of the temporal logic is quite different from the one for propositional logic (in particular, the former needs a point of evaluation to give meaning to formulas), the rules for the Boolean part coincide, and are given by the grammar Bool. Observe also that the point of evaluation in a temporal logic is not part of the syntax of the language, in the same way a valuation is not part of a formula in propositional logic.
As in the previous experiment, we considered the size of a formula as the number of atoms plus the number of operators, and the MDL of a concept with respect to a given language of description as the length of the shortest formula in such language describing the concept.
For example, the concept C = "there is a rainy day and, then, a non-rainy day" can be simply described by F(r ∧ F¬r) in the language given by Temp. One can check that this is the shortest formula compatible with C, and so the MDL of C with respect to Temp is 5. If we change the language to Bool, we can no longer describe C as the above formula because F is not allowed in Bool. However, it can be described by the
, of size 11, which can be constructed in Bool. One can show that there is no shorter formula in Bool describing C, and so the MDL of C with respect to Bool is 11.
As shown in Table 2 , subjects belonging to the target (F) group were trained on three concepts: x i , F(r∧F(¬r∧Fr)) (at some point it occurs r, then ¬r and then r), and F(r ∧ FF¬r) (at some point it occurs r, and then, at least two days later, ¬r occurs).
Subjects in the control group were presented with concepts:
where we use the different indexes i, j, k, l instead of numbers because variables were randomized for each subject.
After these four concepts, both groups were presented with the same test concepts:
As in the first experiment, we ensured that the minimal formula for the training concepts of the target group was significantly longer when F, G and r were excluded from the language than when they were available, by generating all compatible formulas from the Bool grammar up to length 17 (see Table 2 ). In fact, only F and r are needed for achieving succinctness for the concepts in the target group and in the first test concept. The operator G was included for the sake of semantic completeness: since we only allow for atomic negation, G is needed as the dual of F (namely, ¬F¬ϕ is semantically equivalent to Gϕ.)
Model-Free Results
We measure the subjective difficulty of a given concept as the total time needed by the participant to successfully encode the concept, which indicates that they can 13 express reliable which exemplars belong to the concept and which do not. This is, the time spent in the learning, testing and feedback phases from Fig. 2 .
Participants from the Xor (resp. F) group were able to encode the test concept that uses the ⊕ (resp. F) operator much more efficiently than participants in the control group, see Fig. 5 (top row) . In other words, having encoded concepts that require one specific target operator T in order to be succinctly expressed caused participants to encode more efficiently the test concept that required T in order to be succinctly expressed. Under the assumption that the subjective difficulty of concepts is proportional to the length of the programs that represent them, this result is only explained if participants in the target group incorporated this operator into their language after being exposed to the training concepts.
Importantly, the concepts of the target group did not require participants to use T in order to be encoded, but they were more succinctly encoded if they did. Contrastingly, participants in the control group were not previously presented with concepts that needed T to be succinctly encoded. When presented with the test concept that use T , the control group needed much more time to successfully encode the concept, suggesting that they were dealing with more complex explanations than participants' in the target group, or, equivalently, that T was not readily available in their language.
To quantify this result we measure, for each participant, the relative time spent in the first test concept (that use ⊕ in the first experiment and F in the second one) compared to the total time spent in the two test concepts. Participants from the target groups were able to go through the test concept that uses T faster than participants in the control groups (see Fig. 5, top) . When comparing the time spent in the test concept that use T with the total time spent in the two test concepts, a paired t-test reveals t = 8 (p = 10 −7 ) for the first experiment and t = 4.33 (p < 0.001) for the second one, indicating that the relative time spent in the test concept that used T was much longer for the control group than for the target group.
This result shows that the subjective difficulty of a concept strongly depends on prior exposure to other concepts that share the same primitives in a LoT. 
Model
We examine the hypothesis that experience shapes the repertoire of the LoT, by compiling expressions which are used frequently into new symbols of the language. We examine this hypothesis relying on models which combine symbolic representations with statistical approaches [34, 35, 36] , by implementing a space of compositional hypothesis generated by a rule producing probabilistic grammar [37] .
In simpler words, we deal with a symbolic language in which the different symbols and operations of the language are used with different probabilities. This allows us to inquire whether experience affects these probabilities, providing a quantitative and graded manner to address changes in the repertoire of symbols of a language of thought.
Under this model, the probability of retrieving a certain sequence of symbols decrease exponentially with the length of the sequence. To test if humans have the ability to compile primitives into new useful symbol in the language, we anticipated the new compiled symbol and include it a priori in the language, but with vanishing probability of being used. We include the compiled rule a priori in the language to simplify the model, but the probability of using the compiled symbol can be analogously interpreted as the probability that a rational agent that does not have the compiled symbol a priori decides to add the compiled expression to her language (as a new primitive). After incorporating the new symbol, the probability of retrieving it is much higher than the probability of separately retrieving each element that comprises it.
We first describe how concept learning occurs assuming a fixed LoT (subsection Fixed Model ). Then, we describe how concept learning occurs if we allow the LoT to change based on the sequence of concepts experienced so far (subsection Dynamic Model )
Fixed Model
Under the Language of Thought assumption, given a concept C (e.g. Fig. 1 ), the probability that an agent uses formula ϕ to explain this concept is defined by Bayes 16 theorem:
(1)
The likelihood P (C | ϕ) of a logical statement ϕ can be simply defined as 1 if the statement is true for the given concept C and 0 otherwise. In other words, for any given concept, only explanations that describe this concept are considered as possible explanations. The likelihood term has been defined more flexibly in the literature [37, 11] , allowing for mislabeled elements. We keep this simpler definition in order to reduce the number of free parameters of the model, as we do not intend to account for mislabeling errors in our experiment.
The prior P (ϕ) is defined by augmenting the context-free grammars shown in Fig. 3 into probabilistic context-free grammars (PCFG). In the PCFG, each rule has associated a parameter indicating the probability of using that rule. A PCFG can be used to produce logical statements in the same manner as in a CFG (see legend in Fig. 3 for an example): each non terminal remaining in the statement is expanded using a rule of the PCFG with probability proportional to that rule's associated parameter, until no nonterminals remain in the statement. Intuitively, the probability of producing a certain statement ϕ is proportional to the product of the rules that were used in producing that statement, and therefore inversely proportional to the formula's length |ϕ|. We formally explain how this term is calculated in the next subsection.
We assume that the probability that a subject uses formula ϕ to explain concept C is proportional to the posterior P (ϕ | C), and the subjective difficulty d C of a concept C to a participant is proportional to the length of the formula (|ϕ|) that the participant is using to explain that concept. However, one there is no way to know directly from the data which formula ϕ the participant is using (and therefore we do not know |ϕ|).
Hence, the most parsimonious approach is to consider the entire posterior distribution P(ϕ | C) over possible formulas 1 .
Given a concept C, the expected length E C (|ϕ|) of the formulas used by the participant under her posterior distribution P(ϕ | C) is simply:
where the sum is over all compatible formulas produced by the PCFG (with probability P (ϕ)). Since we do not know |ϕ|, we can only estimate the difficulty of concept C experienced by the participant using the estimated value of |ϕ| under her posterior distribution (i.e. E C (|ϕ|)):
where we added a term that accounts for the cardinality of the concept extension: N C is the number of marked items in the screen (e.g. 8 in Fig. 1, left) or 16 minus the number of marked items if the cardinality is greater than 8, and α is a free parameter fitted globally for all concepts and subjects to its maximum likelihood value of 0.45.
In this way, we remove the asymmetry between positive and negative examples, while accounting for the toil taken by considering a larger number of items simultaneously.
In practice, to approximate E C (|ϕ|) for each concept C, we calculated the posterior probability P (ϕ | C) of all compatible formulas ϕs generated by the Bool, Xor, Bool and Temp grammars up to size 19 and then use (2) . Since the space of all possible ϕs grows exponentially with |ϕ|, normative procedures for estimating P (ϕ | C) in this space involve stochastic search algorithms. However, in our experiment we were able to exhaustively enumerate and calculate the posterior probability of all formulas generated by the PCFG up to a sufficiently high size M such that all formulas with |ϕ| > M have vanishing probabilities when compared to shorter compatible formulas for the current concept (because the prior P (ϕ) decrease exponentially with the size of the formula and the likelihood of all compatible formulas is equal to 1).
Dynamic Model
Up to this point, we assumed that, given a concept C, the posterior distribution over formulas P (ϕ | C) was independent of the other concepts presented to the partici-pant. However, if the rule's probabilities in the PCFG of each participant are updated accordingly to the concepts that she experiences, the prior P (ϕ) in (1) will change with experience, and so will E C (|ϕ|) in (2) and finally her subjective difficulty d C in (3) . Therefore, the subjective difficulty of a concept experienced by a participant will depend on the sequence of concepts that were previously presented to this participant.
In other words, since now P (ϕ) depends on the sequence of concepts experienced by the participant, instead of (1), we have:
where C t is the concept presented at trial t, and P (ϕ | C 1 , . . . , C t−1 ) depends on the state of the PCFG at trial t, which in turn depends on how the PCFG gets updated from trial to trial.
Intuitively, the update process increases the probability of using a certain rule in the PCFG accordingly to how useful this rule was to compress compatible formulas for the concepts previously learned in the same domain. Specifically, we model the update process in a normative manner: the probability of using a rule of the PCFG at trial t is equal to the Bayesian posterior probability that this rule will enable the learner to find compressed explanations at trial t, according to how useful it was to compress explanations in trials 1, . . . , t − 1.
To formalize the update of the PCFG, we define P (ϕ) similarly to [37] . Specifically, the prior probability of a logical statement at trial t in the concept sequence uses a single Dirichlet-multinomial for the set of rule expansions. The Dirichlet is parameterized by a set of positive real numbers D t i , one for each rule i in the PCFG, which in turn determine the probability of using rule i at trial t: a higher D i indicates a higher probability of using rule i.
The prior is specified by the set Dirichlet parameters D 0 with which we start the experiment (D 0 represents a vector containing the prior parameters of all rules in the grammar at trial 0). In our experiment, we set the prior Dirichlet parameters of all rules equal to 1, and the parameter of the rule that expands the target operator to a value several orders of magnitude smaller (≈ 10 −4 ). This means that the target operator was practically absent at the beginning of the experiment, but it was technically possible to 'learn it' by increasing its probability as the experiment developed.
Under the Dirichlet model, the prior P (ϕ | C 1 , . . . , C t−1 ) can be rewritten using the Dirichlet parameters as P (ϕ | D t ). Therefore, to know how P (ϕ | C) updates from trial to trial, we only need to know how D updates from trial to trial.
The Dirichlet parameter of rule i at trial t+1 is equal to its parameter at trial t plus the amount of times the production i was used in generating all formulas compatible with the concept at trial t (we note M i (ϕ) as the number of times that rule i is used in generating formula ϕ), weighted by each formula's posterior probability at trial t:
This Bayesian learning mechanism increases the probability of using rules that allow concepts to be succinctly described. This happens because these formulas have higher probability than longer formulas, so the Dirichlet parameters of the rules that comprises these formulas increase more strongly than those of the rules that comprises longer formulas. Crucially, this sole Bayesian mechanism can account for all observed patterns in the experiments. We do not need to posit an external, computationally demanding, heuristic compositional process to model the data; it suffices to exploit the learning dynamics already built in the model.
For comparison, we include results from an 'Inflexible Model', in which the probability of using different rules of the PCFG model do not update from trial to trial, such that the rule that use target operator remains with a low prior probability throughout the trials of the experiment, indicating that the agent is incapable of compiling. This is, the Inflexible model has fixed Dirichlet parameters throughout the concept sequence, equal to D 0 .
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Results
The model accurately captures the dynamics of learning across concepts. If we did not allow the model to increase the probability of using the compiled operator T between concepts (⊕ in the first experiment and F in the second one), the control group and the target group would be indistinguishable in the test phase, so the model would predict equal average formula length for both groups (see Fig. 5 , bottom row).
Instead, by adjusting the prior probability of T based on concept exposure, the flexible model is able to capture learning time patterns in the target groups (R concept sequences, which were designed to this effect. If the concepts do not bias the PCFG's production rules one way or the other, it is expected that an inflexible model will provide a reasonable fit. However, it is difficult to tell a priori how unbiased a set of concepts really is, so experiments relying on repeated concept exposure should always take learning into account.
As suggested in previous studies [39] , allowing the model to update its beliefs from concept to concept is a requisite to capture human learning times. We now explain why the pattern of subjective difficulties from Fig. 6 (top row) is accurately captured by a rational model that updates the probability of using the compiled function (i.e.
⊕ and F) in a Bayesian manner, according to how useful it was to compress concepts so far (Fig. 6 (middle row) ).
In this scenario, learning for the model is formalized by the update of rule parameters from concept t to concept t + 1 according to (5) . In Fig. 7 we show how this learning takes place in the sequence of concepts of these experiments. For the xor group, there are mainly two competing formulas the first time the second concept is 
Humans
Model
Inflexible Model Figure 6 : Learning times and model predictions for the xor group in experiment 1 and the F group in experiment 2 (see Tables 1 and 2 for concept details). Learning times are normalized so that they sum to 1 for each participant. The predicted difficulties of each model were calculated using Equation (3).
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presented: x i ⊕ x j and (x i ∧ ¬x j ) ∨ (¬x i ∧ x j ). Note that after the first time the second concept is presented the parameters of the ∧ and ∨ rules increase more than the parameter of the ⊕ rule (the plot is in logarithmic scale). This happens because, given the low a priori value of the parameter of the ⊕ rule, the posterior of the formulas of type (x i ∧ ¬x j ) ∨ (¬x i ∧ x j ), which do not use the ⊕ operator, is much higher than the posterior of x i ⊕ x j . For the same reason, in Fig. 6 we see a large predicted difficulty by the flexible model for this concept (since the posterior lies mainly over these longer formulas without ⊕, see (2)). However, the little increment in the ⊕ rule after the second concept is sufficient for making the formula x k ⊕ x l to have higher relative posterior the second time this concept is presented, making the increment in the parameter of the ⊕ rule much greater than before. Additionally, the difficulty inferred by the model is much smaller the second time the concept is presented (compare fourth and second concepts in Fig. 6 ), since now the posterior is more evenly distributed between long (without ⊕) and short (with ⊕) formulas (see (2)). Finally, when the concept compatible with the formula x i ∧ (x j ⊕ x k ) is presented in the test, the learner has completely compiled the xor rule into her language, ascribing the formulas that use the ⊕ operator a much higher posterior probability relative to the long formulas that do not use the ⊕ operator. Therefore, the inferred difficulty is much smaller than those describing previous concepts (see fifth concept in Fig. 6 ).
A similar pattern is observed for the F group. When the second and third concepts are presented, the low value of the F rule parameter causes most of the posterior to lie on the (longer) alternatives that do not use F. However, the formulas that do use F have a non zero posterior probability, significant enough to cause the parameter of the F rule to increase according to (5) . Finally, when the test concept compatible with the formula F(r∧F¬r) is presented, the shorter formulas that use F have higher posterior probability than the longer alternatives without F, so we see a low the predicted difficulty for concept four in Fig. 6 .
Updating the probability of using the compiled rule is therefore crucial to capture human learning patterns. A natural question is if it is possible to capture human learning patterns without compiling the target operator, and instead independently updating the probability of the rules that comprises it. In other words, we have shown that the Dynamic Model over the Xor and Temp grammars capture human patterns much more accurately than the Inflexible Model over these grammars, and now we ask if the Dynamic Model over the Bool grammar (that does not have the compiled operators ⊕ and F) would also capture human learning patterns. This model, however, makes practically the same predictions than the Inflexible Model (shown in Fig. 6 (bottom)). This happens because to express the concepts that use the target operators ⊕ and F in the Bool grammar we use a lengthy, unbiased combination of the rules from Bool, so learning does not bias the parameters of the Bool grammar one way or the other: the sequence of concepts learned during training does not create any useful bias in the production probabilities of the grammar in order to learn more efficiently the test concept. Including the possibility of compiling the target operator is therefore key to predict human subjective difficulties. Figure 7 : Evolution of Dirichlet parameters of different rules along the experiment.
Discussion
Showing that learning leads to a process of compiling primitives into new functions in a LoT is the main contribution of this work. We also made two methodological contributions. First, we use the model in a novel way to predict concept learning times by tying them to the length of their compatible formulas weighted by their posterior probability. Second, the temporal logic we use in our second experiment is a modal logic whose expressive power is, in the general setting, halfway between propositional and first order logic. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first use of a modal logic in the study of human concept learning.
We showed that the human subjective difficulty in learning concepts strongly depends on the exposure to prior concepts in the experiment. Participants that experienced a set of concepts that could be succinctly described only if a target operator T was used were able to encode more efficiently the test concept that also needed T to be described in simpler terms when compared with participants in the control group. Furthermore, the relative subjective difficulty of the sequence of concepts is accurately described by a Bayesian PCFG, which includes the compiled target operator with vanishing probability and rationally updates as it becomes more useful.
Participants' behavior is consistent with a language that compiles a new target operator T as it becomes more useful, therefore reducing future learning times, or, in other words, maximizing the expected value of future computations within resourcebounded constraints [40] by minimizing the expected description length of future concepts. This behavior emerged naturally from the Bayesian learning dynamics already build in our model, without the need to add an external heuristic compositional process (e.g. [30, 31] ). Previous works have similarly shown that participants behavior maximizes the expected value of computation in various domains, by rationally using cognitive resources (e.g. [41] , see [42, 43] for reviews). Indeed, these notions of computational rationality seem to be paving the way to human-like machine intelligence in various real word applications [44] .
Although it is clear that the learning of new operations is more efficient in a communicative or pedagogical context [46, 47, 48] , we have shown that it takes place in an undirected setting, where participants' only reward for doing it is a bet on reducing future learning times. Importantly, we do not claim that participants have explicitly learned the ⊕ or F operators as per their formal definitions in natural language. However, their language of thought seem to have generated an operation that is sufficient to compress such patterns of data in order to identify them more quickly. Similarly, studies in implicit finite-state grammar learning experiments have shown that participants do not need to explicitly know the rules they have learned in order to perform well [49, 50] .
In our experiment, to study the degree to which learning was implicit or explicit (this is, if the participant was or not aware of it), we included a verbal report after each concept, and found, in general, similar verbal reports for participants in the control and target groups, indicating that the knowledge acquired by the target group could be implicit. However, a more formal approach is necessary to distinguish implicit and explicit knowledge in concept learning [51] . For example, one could ask for a confidence report and see if confidence increases with the accuracy in encoding the concept, suggesting explicit knowledge. Recently, [52] studied the determinants of confidence in a concept learning task, and found that, although subjective difficulties did follow the rational model, subjective confidence was primarily determined by external factors, and only secondarly by the probability of having correctly encoded the concept, indicating that implicit knowledge may play a principal role in general concept learning.
By probing and modeling the dependence of the LoT with prior concept exposure, we also highlight a fundamental difficulty in trying to experimentally uncover what the actual human symbolic substrate of thought is. These permanent change in rule probabilities has been mostly disregarded in the LoT literature [45] . Most works simply do away with them by integrating them out and focusing only on formula probabilities [37] . Some, while still marginalizing the probabilities, do look at changes in Dirichlet parameters, but with an emphasis on rule utility, ignoring the influence ex-perience exerts on them [11] . We claim that when a specific language beats a second one at fitting some experimental data, what we may be seeing is an effect of prior experience (including from the experiment itself), more than an intrinsic feature of the LoT. Experimental results have, for instance, shown that a grammar with and, or, and not better explains Boolean concept learning than one with nand, despite both being representationally equivalent [11] . In our view, this cannot be taken to mean anything more than that in the current state of affairs of the world, the nand operator is not very useful for compressing information. We have shown, however, that participants can rapidly compile new expressions in their LoT if they begin to be useful, which emphasizes that one cannot simply ignore the order in which concepts are presented to the participant when studying aspects of the LoT.
When Fodor proposed the Language of Thought hypothesis [4] , what he had in mind was a symbolic system we all came equipped with from birth. Stating that this language is in fact flexible might seem in outright contradiction with Fodor's original idea. In fact, what studies in the LoT literature (including this one) are probably probing is one among many languages in a hierarchy of increasing abstraction, and beginning with Fodor's proposed language. As we progress in life, we find some conceptual summaries useful, and compiled them in a more abstract token. It is even likely that there is no proper hierarchy with sharply defined boundaries between levels, but instead a less organized progression of concepts of increasing abstraction, with thought progressing seamlessly using constructs at different levels. The software analogy of programming languages compiling to lower level machine code might be utterly misguided, with current approaches to compositionality inherently limited by the hierarchical view.
Further empirical studies of the way we effectively reuse concepts will hopefully pave the way for a broader understanding of human cognition. Xor Group
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